Skip to main content

The EU’s Revolving Door Problem: How Big Business Gains Privileged Access

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

The revolving door phenomenon—when former public officials move to lobby jobs in the private sector, or vice versa—is an integral part of the EU lobbying picture. Revolving door rules, such as cooling-off periods or restrictions on contacts with former colleagues, are required to manage risks of conflicts of interest. Different actors in the EU institutions are covered by different such rules, including the EU Staff Regulations, the Code of Conduct for Commissioners and the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), but these rules are often inadequate. A series of revolving door case studies illustrate both cases where the respective rules are too weak or ineffective The European Ombudsman has been investigating the European Commission on its role in implementing stricter rules. Yet, public interest policy-making requires that the revolving door-type conflicts of interest to be monitored, regulated and publicly scrutinized.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   29.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   59.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Luechinger, S. and Moser, C. (2012), The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market, VOX; http://www.voxeu.org/article/value-revolving-door-political-appointees-and-stock-market.

  2. 2.

    Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) (2013), Banking on the revolving door: Rules full of loopholes for former finance officials; http://corporateeurope.org/news/banking-revolving-door-rules-full-loopholes-former-finance-officials.

  3. 3.

    CEO (2013), From CCS to unsustainable biomass: the revolving door in EU climate and energy policy; http://corporateeurope.org/revolving-doors/2013/08/ccs-unsustainable-biomass-revolving-door-eu-climate-and-energy-policy.

  4. 4.

    Code of Conduct for Commissioners, C (2011) 2904; http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010–2014/pdf/code_conduct_en.pdf; this revised version followed an earlier code that was introduced in 2004.

  5. 5.

    Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament with respect to financial interests and conflicts of interest; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/meps/201305_Code_of_conduct_EN.pdf.

  6. 6.

    Brussels Sunshine Blog (2011), Cash-for-amendments scandal just the tip of the iceberg, http://blog.brusselssunshine.eu/2011/03/cash-for-amendments-scandal-just-tip-of.html.

  7. 7.

    Bureau decision of 12 April 1999, consolidated in 2004 and 2009.

  8. 8.

    6 June 2012 response from European Parliament to CEO’s access to documents request for ‘A list of all former MEPs who have surrendered their access pass in connection with the Code of Conduct’.

  9. 9.

    Staff Regulations, 1.5.2004; http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf.

  10. 10.

    Provisional edition revised Staff Regulations, 2 July 2013; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef = -//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013–0287+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.

  11. 11.

    Brussels Sunshine Blog (2012), Ex-Commissioners going through the revolving door: transparency promise delayed; http://blog.brusselssunshine.eu/2012/01/ex-commissioners-going-through.html.

  12. 12.

    European Experience Company; http://www.european-experience.de/english.

  13. 13.

    CEO (2011), Commission wrong to approve Verheugen’s lobby consultancy—new ethics rules must be Verheugen-proof; http://corporateeurope.org/blog/commission-wrong-approve-verheugen-lobby-consultancy-new-ethics-rules-must-be-verheugen-proof.

  14. 14.

    ALTER-EU (2011), Revolving door provides privileged access: Why the European Commission needs a stricter code of conduct, 8–9; http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/revolving_door_provides_privileged_access.pdf.

  15. 15.

    Kreab Gavin Anderson (2009), Press Release; http://pr.euractiv.com/pr/former-member-european-parliament-karin-riis-j-rgensen-joins-kreab-gavin-anderson-89391.

  16. 16.

    CEO (2013), Complaint forces European Privacy Association to confirm Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo are corporate backers; http://corporateeurope.org/lobbycracy/2013/06/complaint-forces-european-privacy-association-confirm-facebook-google-microsoft.

  17. 17.

    CEO (2012), Crowd sourced lobby exposé shows Internet giants have footprints on our data privacy laws; http://corporateeurope.org/lobbycracy/2013/02/crowdsourced-lobby-expos-shows-internet-giants-have-footprints-our-data-privacy.

  18. 18.

    CEO (2009), Revolving Door Watch: Erika Mann; http://corporateeurope.org/revolvingdoorwatch/cases/erika-mann.

  19. 19.

    Cabinet DN, ‘John Purvis’; http://www.cabinetdn.com/our-team/john-purvis-cbe/; for more details, and other revolving door MEPs, see CEO (2011), ‘The European Parliament’s Revolving Door’; http://corporateeurope.org/revolving-doors/2011/06/european-parliaments-revolving-door.

  20. 20.

    CEO (2009), Revolving Door Watch: Derek Taylor; http://corporateeurope.org/revolvingdoorwatch/cases/derek-taylor.

  21. 21.

    CEO (2010), Revolving Door Watch: John Bruton; http://corporateeurope.org/revolvingdoorwatch/cases/john-bruton.

  22. 22.

    CEO (2012), Revolving Door Watch: Jörgen Holmquist; http://corporateeurope.org/revolvingdoorwatch/cases/j-rgen-holmquist.

  23. 23.

    CEO (2011), Revolving Door Watch, Fanny-Pomme Langue; http://corporateeurope.org/revolvingdoorwatch/cases/fanny-pomme-langue.

  24. 24.

    CEO (2012), Greenpeace EU Unit, Lobby Control and Spin watch complaint to the European Ombudsman about the Commission’s inadequate implementation of Article 11a and 16 in the Staff Regulations; http://corporateeurope.org/blog/commissions-refusal-block-revolving-door-triggers-ombudsman-complaint.

  25. 25.

    Ombudsman investigation launched February 2013; see http://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2013/eu-ombudsman-launches-investigation-commission-alleged-failure-curb-conflicts.

  26. 26.

    ALTER-EU (2011), Revolving door provides privileged access: Why the European Commission needs a stricter code of conduct; http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/revolving_door_provides_privileged_access.pdf.

  27. 27.

    CEO (2008), Revolving Door Watch: Michel Petite; http://corporateeurope.org/revolvingdoorwatch/case/michel-petite.

  28. 28.

    Clifford Chance, Michel Petite; http://www.cliffordchance.com/about_us/find_people_and_offices/lawyers/fr/michel_petite.html.

  29. 29.

    CEO (2012), Revealed: EU’s revolving door facilitates tobacco lobby meetings; http://corporateeurope.org/blog/revealed-revolving-door-facilitates-tobacco-lobby-meetings.

  30. 30.

    Letter from Commission to CEO et al., January 2013.

  31. 31.

    Clifford Chance, Political advocacy strategy; http://www.cliffordchance.com/legal_area/public_policy/political_advocacy_strategy.html.

  32. 32.

    CEO (2012), European Commission’s “Petite problem” investigated; http://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2013/european-commissions-petite-problem-investigated.

  33. 33.

    Lobby Control, Corporate Accountability International and CEO, Ombudsman complaint reappointment of Mr. Michel Petite to the European Commission’sad hoc ethical committee membership; https://www.lobbycontrol.de/wp-content/uploads/130208-Petite-Ombudsman-Complaint_final1.pdf.

  34. 34.

    CEO (2013), ‘Why is the EU lagging in its political recognition of the revolving-door? A Petite problem’; http://corporateeurope.org/blog/why-eu-lagging-its-political-recognition-revolving-door-problem-petite-problem.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rachel Tansey M.A. .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tansey, R. (2014). The EU’s Revolving Door Problem: How Big Business Gains Privileged Access. In: Dialer, D., Richter, M. (eds) Lobbying in der Europäischen Union. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-03221-0_17

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-03221-0_17

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-658-03220-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-658-03221-0

  • eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Science (German Language)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics