Abstract
This chapter reviews the literature on the democratic contributions of CSOs, as well as their critics, and demonstrates how this study is situated within this debate. Against the backdrop of the existing literature, the relevance and importance of the present research will be clarified.
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Notes
- 1.
das “Gemeinwohl” (Fraenkel [1964] 1991: 290)
- 2.
“gruppenmäßig differenzierte antagonistische heterogene Gesellschaft“ (Fraenkel [1964] 1991: 267)
- 3.
“Der Pluralismus stellt gleichsam einen Transformator dar, in dem gesellschaftliche in politische Energie umgewandelt wird” (Fraenkel [1964] 1991: 275).
- 4.
Even in these conceptions, the involvement of CSOs is seen as a supplement to rather than a substitute for representative democracy (Hirst 1994: 42).
- 5.
Chandler (2004) illustrates the role of CSOs in promoting democracy in post-conflict Bosnia, for example, and Jünemann (2004) does the same for CSOs in the EU-Mediterranean Partnership. Heinrich (2001: 1) assesses the contribution of CSOs to consolidating democracy in South Africa, for instance by bridging societal cleavages, and concludes that it is “significant”. Bernhard (1993), Mushaben (2004), and Bucholtz (1998) depict how civil society and its organisations assisted in the democratic transitions in East and Central European countries by contesting government policy and curtailing state autonomy.
- 6.
Olson had a different understanding of the public good compared to most contemporary writers. As noted earlier, a public interest group today usually denotes an organisation that is committed to serving the society as a whole, such as environmental groups. Private interest groups are defined as serving only the interest of their members. In contrast, Olson (1965: 15, footnote 22) clarified: “There is no necessity that a public good to one group in a society is necessarily in the interest of a society as a whole.” To him, any common good is a public good: “(…) the achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group” (Olson 1965: 15).
- 7.
“Die Existenz einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft (…) setzt auch voraus, daß die pluralistischen Parteien und Verbände demokratisch sind, das heißt, daß sie offene Gesellschaften darstellen, die nicht von Eliten, die sich durch Kooption ergänzen, beherrscht werden, sondern als Stätten zu dienen vermögen, an denen jeder Bürger sich aktiv zu betätigen in der Lage ist, an denen er nicht nur reden kann, sondern auch eine Chance besitzt, gehört zu werden, an denen er nicht nur fragen kann, sondern auch eine Antwort erhält, an denen er nicht als Nummer behandelt, sondern als Mitglied respektiert wird” (Fraenkel [1964] 1991: 276).
- 8.
This suggests an interdependent relationship between the elite and non-elite of an organisation. For details, see Burton and Higley (1987: 231-5).
- 9.
At first glance, this dilemma appears to correspond with the competing imperatives of organisations described by Schmitter and Streeck (1999) for business interest associations. They argue that associations must combine the logic of influence with the logic of membership. The former requires organisations to “be organized in such a way as to offer sufficient incentives to enable them to gain access to and exercise adequate influence over public authorities”. The latter obliges them to “structure themselves and act so as to offer sufficient incentives to their members to extract from them adequate resources to ensure their survival, if not growth” (Schmitter and Streeck 1999: 19). These definitions reveal, however, that their research interest is fundamentally different from the one pursued here. While Schmitter and Streeck are interested in organisational survival and maintenance and make it clear that they “dissent from” any “democratic ideological presumption”, this study puts internal democracy – and a possible loss of it – at centre stage. Put differently, the authors take an entrepreneurial perspective, which is concerned with “how the executive [of an organisation, author’s addition] resolves the conflicting demands of member incentives and environmental imperatives” (Wilson 1973: 237). In contrast, this research poses a normative question about inner-organisational democracy. The second set of alternatives offered by the authors comes closer to this study’s interest, namely the distinction between the “logic of efficient implementation” and the “logic of goal formation” (Schmitter and Streeck 1999: 19), but the same reservations apply. Schmitter and Streeck have adopted this dichotomy from Child et al. (1973) (see above) and adapted it, especially by stripping it of its normative content.
- 10.
Some classical thinkers of elite theory shared Michels’ view of the inevitability, but held other factors responsible for it. Following Mosca (1939), it is the better organising capacities of small minorities over large majorities that lead to elite rule in organisations. According to Pareto (1935), the reason for the inevitability of elites are different talents of individuals.
- 11.
“Es ist gerade so, als ob man von einem Willen der Stiefelkonsumenten reden wollte, der für die Art, wie der Schuster seine Technik einrichten sollte, maßgebend sein müsse! Die Schuhkonsumenten wissen zwar, wo sie der Schuh drückt, aber niemals, wie er besser gemacht werden soll.” (cited in Mommsen 1974: 421)
- 12.
Recent research shows that, at least in the United States, professionalised organisations have not displaced non-professional membership organisations (Walker et al. 2011).
- 13.
This problem is likely to be more pertinent for general interest groups, which show a greater reliance on external funding sources than special interest groups (Piewitt et al. 2010).
- 14.
Such a statute would be applicable to both general and special interest organisations.
- 15.
Art. 32 BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)
- 16.
Loi sur les associations sans but lucratif, Art. 7
- 17.
www.eplo.org/about-us.html (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 18.
This review of the research on CSOs in the EU does not make a claim to completeness. Overviews of the literature on interest representation in the EU have also been provided by Coen (2007), Finke (2007), Greenwood (2007), and Beyers et al. (2008), for example.
- 19.
Art. 14(1) TEU
- 20.
Art. 24(1) and 36 TEU (foreign and security policy), Art. 70 ff. and 81 ff. TFEU (justice and home affairs), Art. 113 TFEU (taxation)
- 21.
Art. 12(b) TEU
- 22.
“Kommunikations-, Erinnerungs- and Erfahrungsgemeinschaft” (Kielmansegg 2006: 58)
- 23.
“demokratiefähig” (Kielmansegg 2006: 61)
- 24.
Art. 14(1) TEU
- 25.
Comitology describes the committee system through which member states oversee the European Commission when implementing legislation.
- 26.
Art. 11(4) TEU
- 27.
The other two types are CSOs involved in activities that promote European integration and identity and CSOs from Western Europe (Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011: 2).
- 28.
In contrast to later publications, this document still explicitly excluded trade unions and employers’ organisations from the definition of “voluntary organizations” (European Commission 1997: 2).
- 29.
The term “civil dialogue” is used by both EU institutions and academics in analogy to the “social dialogue” between European institutions and social partners, although the two are fundamentally different.
- 30.
This dialogue includes “non-governmental organisations working on topics as diverse as consumer protection, the environmental protection, animal welfare, human rights and humanitarian aid, as well as organised labour and employers’ associations and the European Economic and Social Committee” (trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/csd_proc.cfm, last accessed 16 February 2013), an EU consultative body composed of employers, employees, and representatives of a range of other societal interests. The Directorate-General thus addresses general and special interest organisations equally.
- 31.
At this time, the Commission still used the term “non-governmental organizations”, which was later changed to “civil society organizations”. In contrast to earlier publications, which clearly treated general and special interest organisations separately, the distinction becomes softer in the Discussion Paper of 2000. It argues that “in a broader sense”, trade unions as well as professional and business associations are also non-governmental organisations and states that the document deals “primarily” – but apparently not exclusively – with classical NGOs (European Commission 2000: 4).
- 32.
According to the 2002 Communication, civil society organisation can “be used as a shorthand to refer to a range of organisations which include: the labour-market players (i.e. trade unions and employers federations – the ‘social partners’); organisations representing social and economic players, which are not social partners in the strict sense of the term (for instance, consumer organisations); NGOs (non-governmental organisations), which bring people together in a common cause, such as environmental organisations, human rights organisations, charitable organisations, educational and training organisations, etc.; CBOs (community-based organisations), i.e. organisations set up within society at grassroots level which pursue member-oriented objectives, e.g. youth organisations, family associations and all organisations through which citizens participate in local and municipal life; and religious communities” (European Commission 2002: 6).
- 33.
They include the Statute for a European Company of 2001 and the Statute for a European Cooperative Society of 2002 as well as the Statute for a European Foundation and the Statute for a European Mutual Society, for which draft proposals have been presented by the European Commission (www.efc.be/programmes_services/advocacy-monitoring/European-Foundation-Statute/Pages/default.aspx; www.ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/promoting-entrepreneurship/social-economy/mutuals/, last accessed 16 February 2013).
- 34.
A European Association can also be formed by a minimum of two associations, which are based in at least two EU member states, by a merger of associations or by transformation of an association (Council of the EU 2002: 7).
- 35.
European Alliance for the Statute of the European Association (www.easea.eu, last accessed 16 February)
- 36.
Part of this endeavour was the organisation of a public hearing on the statute for a European association at the EESC in Brussels on 28 April 2011, in which the author participated as a speaker (www.civic-forum.fr/site/index.php/en/events/-auditions-publiques-, last accessed 16 February 2013).
- 37.
The Conseil économique et social of France also called on the European Commission to reopen the debate on the SEA and published a detailed report on the matter (Conseil Economique et Social 2008).
- 38.
www.europeanstatuteswrittendeclaration.eu (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 39.
www.easea.eu/pages/Arguments.html (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 40.
See also www.civic-forum.fr/documents/towards_a_structured_framework_for_european_civil_dialogue.pdf and www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/civil-society-day-manifesto-en.pdf (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 41.
http://europa.eu/transparency-register/pdf/key_events_en.pdf (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 42.
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do (last accessed 12 October 2010)
- 43.
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-773_en.htm (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 44.
Ibid.
- 45.
See for example www.alter-eu.org/press-releases/2011/06/23/”transparency-register”-does-not-yet-live-up-to-its-name (last accessed 10 October 2011). ALTER-EU is a coalition of “over 200 public interest groups, trade unions, academics and public affairs firms” (www.alter-eu.org/about, last accessed 16 February 2013) that has made the monitoring of lobby activities in the EU, especially that of business actors, its central mission. ALTER-EU is especially interested in exposing corporate actors lobbying the EU, e.g. lobby consultancies, corporate EU affairs offices, law firms providing lobby services, and think tanks, many of whom boycott the current register (ALTER-EU 2010).
- 46.
http://europa.eu/transparency-register/pdf/facsimile3_en.pdf (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 47.
http://europa.eu/transparency-register/pdf/facsimile2_en.pdf (last accessed 16 February 2013)
- 48.
www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/lobbyAlphaOrderByOrg.do?language=EN (last accessed 10 November 2011)
- 49.
Guo and Musso provided a conceptual framework, which lacks a coherent theoretical base, however. Furthermore, they question the universal applicability of their proposal, arguing that “the heterogeneous nature of the non-profit sector makes it difficult to promote a uniform ‘gold standard’ of representation (…)” (Guo and Musso 2007: 309).
- 50.
See Pitkin (2004) for an account of the changing relationship between representation and democracy.
- 51.
These contributions analyse the acceptance of the leadership as a whole, as opposed to the trust in specific persons, which Pitkin seemed to have in mind.
- 52.
Participatory representativeness is closely related to the notion of responsiveness to members, which is mentioned by others as a crucial element for assessing representativeness (Eulau and Karps 1977; Finer 1974: 259; Halpin 2006: 930).
- 53.
They distinguish between first-degree organisations with individual members and second-degree organisations where members are other CSOs (Active Citizenship Network 2004: 27).
- 54.
Stability refers to the minimum years of existence of a CSO (Active Citizenship Network 2004: 27).
- 55.
Beger (2004: 7) postulates that EU-CSOs “have a proven track record of expertise in the specific area of dialogue that is built upon consultation”, “arguably add value to the issue of dialogue”, “be independent and mandatory, not bound by instructions from outside bodies” and be “transparent about funding”. Thus, he provides a very demanding list of criteria for CSO representativeness.
- 56.
This study omits the investigation of descriptive representativeness as it is not appropriate for EU-level CSOs whose members are organisations and not individuals.
- 57.
Tables and figures are the author’s own presentations unless otherwise specified.
- 58.
The two models of representation can be seen as corresponding with different managing styles of CSOs: Chadwick-Coule (2011) identified a unitary approach, in which “elite experts rule by virtue of their privileged knowledge and position” (ibid: 42), and a pluralist approach, in which the focus is on collective action and room is given to members for critique and debate (ibid: 45, 49).
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Rodekamp, M. (2014). The Representative Role of CSOs in Democracy – Origins of the Debate and the EU Context. In: Their Members’ Voice. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02213-6_2
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