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Abstract

At the beginning of a scientific treatise a commitment about terms and notions used in the discussion has to be made.26 The definition of information and its properties is one basis of this thesis, therefore, the present chapter treats the basic conceptions of information (Section 2.1) and deepens the properties and effects of information in economic situations. The different possibilities for information acquisition will be discussed (Section 2.2), and the credibility of information sources as well as measures to achieve trust in information sources will be examined from the perspective of principal-agent relationships (Section 2.3). Further, the effects of information on market efficiency will be reviewed briefly (Section 2.4) as well as the circumstances of information as an economic commodity (Section 2.5).

Keywords

Private Information Information Processing System Market Participant Agency Cost Search Cost 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frank Rose
    • 1
  1. 1.KorbachGermany

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