Abstract
At the beginning of a scientific treatise a commitment about terms and notions used in the discussion has to be made.26 The definition of information and its properties is one basis of this thesis, therefore, the present chapter treats the basic conceptions of information (Section 2.1) and deepens the properties and effects of information in economic situations. The different possibilities for information acquisition will be discussed (Section 2.2), and the credibility of information sources as well as measures to achieve trust in information sources will be examined from the perspective of principal-agent relationships (Section 2.3). Further, the effects of information on market efficiency will be reviewed briefly (Section 2.4) as well as the circumstances of information as an economic commodity (Section 2.5).
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Referneces
Cf. [Esser 77, p. 68 fp.].
Cf. [Kampis 92, p.51].
Cf. [Haken 92, p. 155].
See [Hopf 83, p. 6 fp.] and [Bode 97] for a review of different conceptions of information in economics.
Semiotics is the general theory of signs, see [Oeser 92, p. 320], [Lyons 83, p. 25 fp.], [Eco 77].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 16], [von Weizsäcker 88, p. 168 fp.].
Cf. [von Weizsäcker 88, p. 200 fp.]. Semantic information requires a receiver of the information, for whom the information has to be understandable. However, this results in the circumstance that semantic information is measurable only as pragmatic information, cf. [von Weizsäcker 88, p. 168 fp.].
Cf. [Shannon 48] and [Shannon 63], [van Lint 80, p. 24fp.].
Cf. [Topsoe 74, p. 5 fp.], [Blahut 87, p. 2 fp.].
Cf. [Viterbi 79, p. 11 fp.], [Gallager 86, p. 5].
Cf. [Topsoe 74, p. 5], [Viterbi 79, p. 7 fp.].
In statistical physics entropy is defined as the logarithm of the number of accessible states of a macroscopic system for a certain energy times the Boltzmann factor k B , cf. [Reif 85, p. 94 fp.]. The higher the entropy, the more states the system can access for a certain energy, and the more indefiniteness is in the system.
Cf. [Topsoe 74, p. 6].
This definition is referred to as the first main proposition of information theory, cf. [Topsoe 74, p. 25].
In case of two possible outcomes the logarithm to the base 2 has to be taken, cf. [Topsoe 74, p. 26], [Viterbi 79, p. 8].
Cf. [Jürgensen 97].
Cf. [Topsoe 74, p. 67 fp.], [Viterbi 79, p. 3 fp.], [Gallager 86, p. 5 fp.], [Blahut 87, p. 8 fp.].
Cf. [Schneider 94].
Cf. [von Weizsäcker 88, p. 200].
Cf. [Viterbi 79, p. 12 fp.], [Gallager 86, p. 4 fp.].
Semantic understanding is usually connected with written or spoken human languages, cf. [Anderson 89, p. 322 fp.], but ‘understanding’ is not restricted to the exchange of information between humans. In biological systems we can find an extensive exchange of information, that requires semantic understanding, for example, in the reproduction process, cf. [Csânyi 92].
Cf. [Rich 83, p. 304].
Haken interprets information as a property emergent in complex systems, and applies the theory of dynamic systems to formalize this conception, cf. [Haken 92, p. 153].
Cf. [Haken 88, p. 16 fp.], [Haken 92, p. 162].
Cf. [Scheck 90, p. 274 fp.].
Cf. [Scheck 90, p. 292 fp.].
On the basis of this model of a dynamic system Haken develops the concept of relative importance of messages to attribute a value to the messages received by the system, cf. [Haken 88, p. 16 fp.], [Haken 92].
For a discussion of the activities and preconditions of information processing within systems see Section 2.1.6 and [Haefner 92b, p. 7 fp.].
Cf. [von Weizsäcker 88, p. 201].
Cf. [von Weizsäcker 72] according to [von Weizsäcker 88, p. 201].
Cf. [Lippman 79, p. 1 fp.].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 31].
See the meaning of uncertainty (or entropy) in the definition of information in Section 2.1.1.1.
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 31–32].
Cf. [Schneeweiß 66], [Laux 91, p. 32 fp.].
Various decision rules, depending on the decision-maker’s risk assessment, can be applied to the choice of an appropriate action, cf. [Laux 91], [Eisenfuhr 94].
Cf. [Laux 91, p. 281].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 33]
Technological information is usually produced by means of research and development (R&D), which is the basis for an increase in knowledge and a precondition for economic progress, cf. [Hopf 83, p. 74].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 36 fp.].
Cf. Section 2.4.
Commodities are valuable because they possess attributes which consumers desire. The quality of a product can therefore be specified by describing the amount of a desirable attribute it possesses. And a product with multiple attributes determining the quality can be described by a vector of the different product attributes having particular values, cf. [Kihlstrom 74a, p. 415 fp.].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 35].
See Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.
Cf. [Wittmann 59] according to [Bode 97, p. 454 fp.].
Significance of information for the recipient system means that ‘information enables the system to initiate meaningful systematic activities that would not be possible without the information’, cf. [Haefner 92b, p. 5]. Hence, the definition is closely related to the pragmatic conception of information.
Cf. [Kuhlen 95, p. 38].
Translation of [Kuhlen 95, p. 38].
Cf. [Steinmüller 93, p. 263], [Rehäuser 96, p. 5].
Synthesized information refers to internally processed information, cf. [Tuthill 90, p. 5]. For a comprehensive treatment of the concepts of knowledge see [Tuthill 90] as well.
Cf. [Rehäuser 96, p. 2 fp].
Translation of [Kuhlen 95, p. 38].
Cf. [Sydow 96], [Willke 96], [Kuhlen 95, p. 38]. 79 Cf. [Rehäuser 96, p. 7].
Cf. [Kuhlen 95, p. 38].
Cf. [Rehäuser96, p.7].
Cf. [Rehäuser96, p.6].
Cf. Section 2.1.6 and [Kuhlen 95, p. 42–43]. Kuhlen speaks about different information products.
For an overview about methods of knowledge representation see [Tuthill 90, p. 226–245] and [Reimer 97], a comprehensive treatment can be found in [Reichgelt 91].
Cf. [Anderson 89, p. 79 fp., 103 fp., 206 fp.].
Cf. [Luger 89, p. 28 fp.].
Cf. [Kolodner86, p. 1].
Kreutzer and McKenzie describe knowledge representations as a set of syntactic and semantic conventions ‘to describe things,’ where ‘things’ may be objects, relations, actions, events or processes. This stresses the fact that representation and interpretation are closely intertwined, cf. [Kreutzer 91, p. 198].
For a comprehensive review of semantic networks see [Sowa 90, p. 1011 fp.] and [Mac Randal 88], for their application to language understanding see [Rich 83, p. 295 fp.]. An overview about linguistics from a cognitive science point of view is given in [Anderson 89, p. 281 fp.].
For a comprehensive treatment of the organization of knowledge and information see [Rowley 92].
See [Salton 83] for information retrieval (IR).
Cf. [Manecke 97a].
Cf. [Manecke 97a, p. 142–143].
See [Knorz 97] for an overview.
Examples are: manual methods, full-text methods, linguistic methods, retrieval-oriented methods (weighted term schemes, vector models, probabilistic retrieval methods), see [Knorz 97] for details.
Cf. [Rowley 91, p. 170–173].
Cf. [Rowley 91, p. 171], [Knorz 97, p. 138]. A more differentiated method to describe and measure the quality of results obtained from an information retrieval system is described in [Wand 96], see [Jeusfeld 97, p. 493] as well.
Cf. [Rowley 92, p. 3].
Cf. [Knorz 97, p. 122–123].
See, for example, [Alter 96, p. 164], [Reichgelt 91, p. 14].
For references see [Rowley 92, p. 14–15], fox abstracting see [Kuhlen 97].
Cf. [Allen 90] and Section 2.1.1.3.
Examples are given by [Kihlstrom 74a] and [Kihlstrom 74b] who implicitly derive the value of information in markets with uncertain product quality, [MacMinn 80] who examines the value of information in the context of a search model, and [Milgrom 82] who investigates the value of information in a sealed-bid auction.
Cf. [Milgrom 82], [Gilboa 91, p. 444, 456], [Nink 91, p. 62–63].
Cf. [Bamberg 76], [Laux 91, p. 299], [Saliger 93, p. 141].
Cf. [Laux 91, p. 297 fp.], [Saliger 93, p. 141].
The conditional probability is determined by application of Bayes’ theorem, cf. [Härtung 89, p. 102], [Laux 91, p. 285 fp.]: (math)
Cf. [Laux 91, p. 305 fp.].
Cf. Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.
Cf. [Akerlof 70].
In Akerlof s model the seller of a used car is assumed to have private information about the quality of his/her car, and the buyer knows that the seller is so informed. Consequently, the buyer worries that the car is offered because it is a ‘lemon.’ If the buyer can be sure that the seller has no private information, the car would be sold for the expected value. But the seller’s private information lowers the selling price, and therefore is of negative value for the owner. Cf. [Milgrom 82].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 32–33].
For strategic interdependence see [Rasmusen 89, p. 21] and Section 3.4.
Kamien and Tauman, for example, analyze the dependence of the value of technological information, i.e., cost-reducing innovations, on the number of possessors of the information, cf. [Kamien 86].
Cf. [Salop 77].
Cf. [McKelvey 90].
Cf. Section 2.1.1.3 and [Hirshleifer 73, p. 33].
Cf. [Schwuchow 97, p. 753 fp.], [Reichwald 87].
Cf. [Haken 92, p. 155].
Cf. Section 2.4.
Cf. [Bode 93, p. 37], [Herget 97, p. 782].
Cf. [Bode 97, p. 452].
Cf. [Bode 93, p. 38 fp.].
Cf. [Allen 90, p. 271], for the production of information and different sources of information see Section 2.2.
Cf. [Herget 97, p. 782].
Cf. [Allen 90, p. 270].
For commodity aspects of information see Section 2.5.1. Hayek argues that in a decentralized economy all relevant information is effectively disseminated via the price system, cf. [Hayek 45]. See Section 2.4.1 as well.
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 34], [Hopf 83, p. 44 fp.], [Allen 90, p. 270 fp.].
Cf. Section 2.5 and [Herget 97, p. 782].
Cf. Section 2.5.1 and [Allen 90, p. 271].
Cf. [Arrow 62], [Williamson 86, p. 161], [Picot 96, p. 109].
This refers to the pragmatic conception of information (Section 2.1.1.3) and the basic model of decision theory (Section 2.1.4). 134 Cf. [Bode 97, p. 453].
In the conception of the basic model of decision theory, however, information can only have a positive value, cf. Section 2.1.4. See Section 2.5. 137 Cf. [Haefner 92b, p. 7].
Cf. [Haefner 92b, p.7].
For a discussion of ‘internal information’ in matter/energy systems see [Lazio 92].
A very general conception conceives all matter/energy structures that perform the quoted functions as information processing systems. These information processing system come along as physical, biological, social, and technical systems, cf. [Haefner 92b].
Cf. [Haefner 92b, p. 8] and [Alter 96, p. 365]. For the application of this conception to information production in economics see [Müller 87].
New information can be produced out of existing information, for example, by rearranging the information or by producing an abstract, cf. [Kuhlen 95, p. 86]. Other forms of manipulating information are: sorting, reformatting, or various types of calculations, cf. [Alter 96, p. 365]. This process, however, does not primarily affect the knowledge represented by the information, the new information is mainly a different representation of the same knowledge, cf. Section 2.1.2.
Cf. [Müller 87, p. 128], [Seng 89, p. 48 fp.], [Corsten 90, p. 159].
The surjective projection r\ is called an information function, cf. [Kiener 90, p. 10].
If this condition does not hold, the information processing system is denoted stochastic, cf. [Kiener 90, p. 10].
Cf. [Ehemann 83] according to [Kiener 90, p. 12], see Section 2.1.4.
Cf. [Marschak 75].
Cf. [Ferstl 93, p. 11 fp.], see [Guntram 85] for a review of the general theory of systems.
Cf. [Ferstl 93, p. 12].
Cf. [Ferstl 93, p. 14], [Guntram 85, p. 302].
Cf. [Mertens 91, p. 10fp.].
Cf. [Scheer 95].
Cf. Section 2.1.1.3.
Cf. [Nelson 70].
Cf. Section 4.2.1.
Cf. [Hirshleifer73, p. 32].
For an economic treatment of R&D activities see, for example, [Kamień 70], [Weitzman 79], [Dasgupta 89].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 33 fp.].
Cf. [Kihlstrom 74a, p. 414] and Section 2.1.4.
Stigler introduced the economics of information, pointing attention to the economics of search processes, see [Stigler 61] and [Gastwirth 76] for an overview.
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 56].
Cf. [McAfee 88] and Section 4.2.2.1.
Cf. Section 2.1.4 and 2.1.5.
In general, the outcome of a decision problem is dependent on the mental resources and the effort spent, cf. [Johnson 85].
Cf. [Dasgupta 89, p. 131].
Cf. [Kihlstrom 74a, p. 421], [Yoon 81].
The dissemination of information about products offered is one important entrepreneurial task, cf. [Kaas 90].
Cf. [Butters 77].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 36] and Section 2.1.1.3.
Cf. [Kaas 90, p. 541].
Cf. [Bagwell 93, p. 200, 225].
Cf. [Butters 77], [Sass 84, p. 37 fp.], [Guimaraes 95].
Cf. [Bagwell 93, p. 224 fp.].
Tellis and Fornell conclude: Tor consumers, advertising cannot be used as a guide to either high or low quality. Though a more heavily advertised brand may be of better quality, the relationship between advertising and quality, albeit positive, is not large enough for advertising to be a good indicator of quality.’ Cf. [Tellis 88, p. 70], [Bagwell 93, p. 203].
Introductory prices above the full-information profit-maximizing price that decline over time as information about the product diffuses are assumed to be a signal of high product quality, cf. [Bagwell 91], [Macho-Stadler 97, p. 212 fp.]. A precondition for prices to signal product quality is a minimum amount of private information a consumer has about the supplier and the products offered prior to the acquisition of price information, cf. [Judd 94]. For a discussion of the concept of signaling in job markets see [Spence 73].
Cf. [Doyle 89].
Cf. [Kihlstrom 74b, p. 99], [Sass 84], [Hänchen 85], [Bagwell 94].
Cf. [Bagwell 93, p. 225]. Akerlof argues in a slightly different way, in his ‘market for lemons’ informed sellers offer cars with a quality below the average quality offered on the market, and thus introduces a negative difference between the true quality level and the one expected by consumers, cf. [Akerlof 70].
Cf. [Stigler 61, p. 216].
Cf. [Kamien 70], [Weitzman 79], [Dasgupta 80].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 192].
Cf. [Varian93, p. 316 fp.].
In an economic relationship one participant has some private information that the other does not have, cf. [Arrow 85, p. 37 fp.], [Rasmusen 89, p. 133 fp.].
For an overview of principal-agent theory see [Ross 73], [Jensen 76], [Pratt 85], [Spremann 87], [Spremann 90], [Kiener 90, p. 19 fp.], [Ordelheide 93, p. 1844], [Picot 96, p.47fp.].
Cf. [Pratt 85, p. 1 fp.].
Cf. [Arrow 85, p. 37].
Cf. [Pratt 85, p. 17].
Cf. [Arrow 85, p. 37].
Cf. [Pratt 85, p. 3], [Spremann 88, p. 617].
Cf. [Jensen 76, p. 308].
Cf. [Spremann 90, p. 562 fp.], [Arrow 85, p. 38 fjp.].
Cf. [Picot 96, p. 49].
Cf. [Spremann 88, p. 617], [Spremann 90, p. 575].
Cf. [Pratt 85, p. 17].
Cf. [Spremann 88, p. 617], [Picot 96, p. 48].
The term ‘efficient’ refers to informational efficiency, see, for example, Section 2.4.1.
Cf. [Spremann 90, p. 577].
Cf. [Spremann 88, p. 618].
Cf. [Eccles 85, p. 152 fp.].
Cf. [Spremann 88, p. 620].
Cf. [Spremann 88, p. 618 fp.].
Cf. [Spremann 88, p. 621 fp.].
Cf. [Picot 96, p. 49–50].
Cf. [Picot 96, p. 50].
Cf. [Arrow 85, p. 46 fjp.].
Cf. Section 2.2.1 and [Johnson 85].
Cf. [Nelson 70].
Cf. [Kaas 90, p. 543].
These characteristics hold, for example, for services that require a high degree of experience, knowledge and education, cf. [Kaas 90, p. 543].
Cf. [Darby 73, p. 68 fp.].
Cf. [Darby 73, p. 69], [Kaas 90, p. 543].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 54], [Spremann 88], [Rasmusen 89, p. 169].
The role of reputation has been extensively studied in game theory, cf. [Kreps 82], [Sabourian 89], [Holler 93, p. 173 fp.].
Cf. [Spremann 88].
Third parties have the opportunity to efficiently perform monitoring and quality assuring tasks because they can concentrate in a special thematic area, become experts in determining the quality of products and services, and spread the costs for information acquisition among a large number of clients. See Section 3.2.3.2.
Licensing is a form of input market regulation that is usually found in the public sector, for example, for physicians or lawyers, cf. [Leland 79], [Shapiro 86].
Cf. [Lizzeri 96].
Examples of third parties that perform monitoring can be found in the literature of financial intermediation, see, for example, [Diamond 84]. See Section 3.2.3.2 as well.
Cf. [McAfee 87, p. 699].
Cf. Section 2.1.1.3.
Cf. [Rothschild 73], [McAfee 87].
Information available on the market is, for example, buyers’ demand and sellers’ supply, cf. [McAfee 87, p. 700]. Under costly information acquisition this information is not acquired by all market participants. A result may be, for example, that agents do not know when and at what prices they can sell or buy, cf. [Ioannides 75, p. 248].
Cf. [Spremann 90] and Section 2.3.2.
Cf. [Hayek 45, p. 525].
Cf. Section 2.1.6. The formation of prices in auctions and bidding is studied in [McAfee 87].
Cf. [Spremann 90, p. 574]. Here, private information of single agents is completely redundant, cf. [Bray 89, p. 263].
In an informationally efficient market there would be no alternative price vector that leaves everyone at least as well off and makes some strictly better off. This can be derived from the definition of Pareto-efficiency, cf. [Varian 93, p. 15, 299 fp.], [Hopf 83, p. 61].
Cf. [Fama 70, p. 383].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 52]. For a comprehensive treatment of auctions and a review of the related literature see [Stark 79], [Engelbrecht-Wiggans 80], [McAfee 87]. Especially capital markets are assumed to be informationally efficient: ‘at any time prices fully reflect all available information,’ cf. [Fama 70, p. 383].
Cf. Section 2.2.
The optimal amount of information acquisition is given by the condition that the marginal costs of information acquisition equal the marginal returns from the information, see Section 2.2.1, [Hopf 83, p. 56], and Section 4.2.
Cf. [Grossmann 80].
Cf. [Grossmann 80, p. 394], [Hopf 83, p. 42].
Cf. [Grossmann 80, p. 395], [Milgrom 82].
Cf. [Hirshleifer 71, p. 567]. Hirshleifer argues in terms of foreknowledge, which he defines as the ability to successfully predict future states of the environment, cf. [Hirshleifer 71, p. 562].
Cf. [Stigler 62, p. 103].
A review of different models is given in [Rothschild 73].
Roughly speaking, search models usually investigate the aspect of missing information in markets, see for example [Ioannides 75]. Whereas, bargaining models mainly focus the effects of asymmetrically informed market participants, cf. [Chatterjee 83].
Cf. [Salop 77].
The argument was derived by means of a sequential search model, cf. [MacMinn 80].
For a definition of reservation values in sequential search processes see Section4.2.2.1.
Cf. [McAfee 87, p. 711 fp.].
Cf. [Milgrom 82], [Engelbrecht-Wiggans 83], [Glosten 85].
Cf. [Akerlof 70].
Cf. [McAfee 87, p. 733]. ‘Information available on the market’ here encloses publicly available information as well as private information.
Cf. [Grossmann 80, p. 394].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 56]. Costs for information acquisition are part of the transaction costs, cf. Section 3.2.2.2.
Cf. [Pratt 85], [Spremann 87], [Laux 90], and Section 2.3.1.4.
Cf. [Williamson 86], [Simon 91].
Cf. [Malone 87].
See Section 3.4.
Cf. [Hirshleifer 73, p. 32].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 69].
Cf. Section 2.1.4, [Kihlstrom 74b, p. 100], and [Laux 91, p. 185 fp.] respectively. Menger [Menger 68, p. 7–31] distinguishes between first-order commodities, i.e., commodities that directly satisfy consumer needs and higher-order commodities, i.e., commodities that substitute or improve the consumption of first-order commodities, cf. [Hopf 83, p. 71–72]. Market information can be characterized as a third-order commodity, for it improves the satisfaction of consumers’ needs, cf. [Hopf 83, p. 74].
Cf. [Tietzel 81, p. 210]. Alchian describes property rights as ‘socially recognized rights of action,’ cf. [Alchian 72]. See [Ordelheide 93, p. 1842] for a brief overview about property rights approaches, and [Whinston 97, p. 175–212] for aspects of copyright protection for electronic products.
Cf. [Andel 92, p. 383], [Musgrave 73, p. 52 fp.]. Musgrave characterizes these goods as social goods, cf. [Musgrave 73, p. 51 fp.].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 80 fp.].
Cf. Section 2.1.1.3 and Section 2.3.2.
Cf. Figure 5.
Cf. Section 2.4.1.
Cf. [Musgrave 73, p. 58 fp.].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 85].
Cf. [Andel 92, p. 385 fp.], [Musgrave 94, p. 63 fp.].
Cf. [Andel 92, p. 385–386].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 87].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 93].
Market participants following the decisions of other market participants can utilize the information inherent in the decisions of those agents. In capital markets these effects are known as herd behavior, cf. [Pfister 98, p. 1, 28], [Banerjee 92].
However, in case of technological information the utilization of the information by competitors is to a large extent restricted to the producer through patents, cf. [Hirsh-leifer 73, p. 33].
Cf. [Tietzel 81, p. 211 fp.].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 86], [Musgrave 94, p. 77 fp.].
Cf. [Bagnoli 89].
Cf. [Musgrave 73, p. 52].
Hopf puts it: ‘information is a typical lemon good,’ cf. [Hopf 83, p. 76, 92], which indicates a tendency to market failures in markets for information.
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 88].
Cf. [Musgrave 73, p. 80 fp.], [Andel 92, p. 386 fp.].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 89].
Cf. [Kuhlen 95, p. xxiii].
Cf. [Kuhlen 95, p. 3–23].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 97].
On perfectly competitive markets prices have to be taken as externally given by every market participant, cf. [Varian 93, p. 282].
Cf. [Allen 90, p. 271].
A monopoly or an oligopoly, cf. [Hopf 83, p. 179, 208].
Cf. Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.3.2 respectively.
Cf. Section 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.6.
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 191 fp.].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 208 fp.].
Cf. [Knoblich 85, p. 561], [Bessler 85, p. 18–27].
The primary need for information occurs in a different enterprise, which is not the enterprise under consideration here, cf. [Knoblich 85, p. 562].
Cf. [Bessler 85, p. 18–27].
The principle functions: combination of production factors, independence, and making profit are according to Gutenberg the basic aspects that characterize enterprises, cf. [Gutenberg 83, p. 2 fp.].
Cf. [Höring 80, p. 914].
Cf. [Knoblich 85, p. 564–565].
For a detailed discussion of information brokers see Section 5.1.4.
Cf. [Bessler 85, p. 173].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 202 fp.].
Cf. [Hopf 83, p. 206], [Varian 95], [Varian 97a], [Varian 97b].
Cf. [Varian 95], [Varian 97b].
Third-degree price discrimination means that different purchasers are charged different prices, but each purchaser pays a constant amount for each unit of the good bought, cf. [Varian 89, p. 600 fp.].
Cf. [Varian 89, p. 599], [Varian 97b].
Perfect price discrimination occurs in a situation in which the seller makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to each consumer, cf. [Varian 89, p. 601].
Here, we simply assumed that there are only two groups of consumers, one with a high and another with a low willingness to pay. In real-life settings, however, there is usually a continuum of the willingness to pay, cf. Section 4.3.1.2.
Cf. [Varian 97b].
It is p l < p h and x l < x h.
Cf. [Varian 97b, p. 8].
Cf. [Varian 97b, p. 9].
Cf. Section 2.1.5.
Cf. [Admati 86].
Cf. [Varian 97b, p. 7].
Cf. [Varian 89, p. 626 fp.], [Varian 95], [Bakos 96], [Bakos 97a].
Cf. [Admati 86].
Cf. [Crawford 82], [Admati 86].
Cf. [Admati 90].
Cf. [Bode 97, p. 452] and Section 2.1.5.
Cf. [Schwuchow 97, p. 776].
Cf. [Alter 96, p. 294–295].
Cf. [Zahedi 96, p. 2088], for telecommunication and computer networks see [Alter 96, p. 470–485], [Tanenbaum 96].
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Rose, F. (1999). Information. In: The Economics, Concept, and Design of Information Intermediaries. Information Age Economy. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99805-8_2
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