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Current Issues in Monetary Economics pp 27–51Cite as

Mechanism Design for Central Banks — Results and Unsolved Issues

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Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

Abstract

The question how monetary institutions should be designed attracted considerable attention during the past years. In the context of the Maastricht Treaty, there has been a surge of papers on the adequate design of the European Central Bank; the breakdown of the Rouble-zone created a strong demand for policy advice about what kind of monetary institutions should be adapted in Eastern European countries; finally, after the breakdown of stability of money demand in many countries, there was a need to redesign monetary policy instruments.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Frankfurt, Mertonstr. 17, D - 60054, Frankfurt/Main, Germany

    Gerhard Illing

Authors
  1. Gerhard Illing
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Hagen, Feithstr. 140, D-58084, Hagen, Germany

    Helmut Wagner (Chair of Macroeconomics) (Chair of Macroeconomics)

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© 1998 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

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Illing, G. (1998). Mechanism Design for Central Banks — Results and Unsolved Issues. In: Wagner, H. (eds) Current Issues in Monetary Economics. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99797-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99797-6_3

  • Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1127-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-99797-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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