Informal Constraints, Culture and Incremental Transition from Plan to Market

  • Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY)


The transition from plan to market is a phase of comparatively rapid institutional change in history. It seems to be fairly simple to identify changes in formal institutions (e.g. redefinitions of property rights). However, most observers, in particular non-economists, will hesitate ascribing foremost importance to these factors in overall societal change. Instead they will emphasize cultural background, historical legacies and, in general, the lasting effects of the initial conditions peculiar to each society in question [Lipset (1987)]. Although these aspects of change may not come to the fore if economic processes in the narrow sense are scrutinized, they seem to influence the interaction between political conflict and decision-making, and the economy in various ways.


Institutional Change Cognitive Model Individual Choice Political Culture Stable Preference 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
    • 1
  1. 1.Gesamthochschule-Universität DuisburgGermany

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