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Zuverlässige Inspektionsstrategien

Conference paper
  • 178 Downloads
Part of the Proceedings in Operations Research book series (ORP, volume 1973)

Abstract

A multi-stage inspector’s game is treated in which the inspector can prevent the aggressor from a gain by an aggressive action if he has sufficient means for inspections. He obtains the means in a random process with distribution R. The question is solved for which R the inspector can prevent the aggressor from a gain by an aggression.

Literatur

  1. [Dr]
    Dresher, M.: A Sampling Inspection Problem in Arms Control Agreements: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. RAND Corp: RM -2972 - ARPA 1962Google Scholar
  2. [Bie]
    Bierlein, D.: Auf Bilanzen und Inventuren basierende Überwachungssysteme Operations Research Verfahren VIII (1970), p. 36 - 43Google Scholar
  3. Höpfinger, E.: Reliable Inspectionsstrategies (erscheint in Mathematical Systems in Economics. Verlag Anton Hain).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag, Rudolf Liebing KG, Würzburg 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.KarlsruheDeutschland

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