Global Economic Rivalry: New Perspectives on Germany (the EC), Japan and the United States

  • Michael Aho
  • Gary R. Saxonhouse


Throughout the postwar period, the United States was accustomed to being master of its own economic fate. As the world’s predominant economic power, America had the ability to mobilize other industrialized economies in time of crisis and to act unilaterally if necessary to protect its interests. But Washington and New York, once the world’s preeminent political and financial capitals, must now share the spotlight with Tokyo, Bonn, Frankfurt and London. In this new multipolar economic world, the United States is still the first among equals. But it no longer has the economic leverage to dictate the course of events. Leadership has of necessity become a collaborative effort. European and Japanese economic and political concerns now place real limits on U.S. action. The U.S. economy and American economic decision-making must now be adapted to an emerging global economy that no longer revolves around the United States.


Monetary Policy European Community Trade Policy European Central Bank Trading System 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Aho
  • Gary R. Saxonhouse

There are no affiliations available

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