Extensive Form Games

  • Eric van Damme


The comprehensive study of normal form games in Chaps. 2–5 has yielded a deeper insight into the relationships between various refinements of the Nash concept. The analysis has also shown that, for (generic) normal form games, there is actually little need to refine the Nash concept since, for almost all such games, all Nash equilibria possess all properties one might hope for.


Nash Equilibrium Normal Form Control Cost Strategy Combination Form Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eric van Damme
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of BonnBonn 1Germany

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