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The Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation

  • Rudolf A. Schüßler

Abstract

It is the aim of this paper to develop a new way to model reciprocal cooperation. Hitherto reciprocity has counted merely as a form of cooperation, which has mainly been treated in the context of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. I will try to show that it is necessary to turn to a different game structure for a satisfactory account of reciprocal cooperation, involving features of a number of cooperation forms that are out of reach of the old structure. In the end I hope to have introduced a tool for the structural analysis of real phenomena, which allows a better appreciation of its richness and complexity than the standard PD.

Keywords

Payoff Matrix Evolutionary Stable Strategy Reciprocal Exchange Reciprocal Altruism Exchange Cycle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg Wien 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rudolf A. Schüßler
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of SociologyUniversity of MunichMunichGermany

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