Abstract
The old issue whether cooperation evolves in a world of egoists and, if so, in what way has recently attracted attention by social scientists focussing on situations corresponding to game-theoretical models like the prisoner’s dilemma or coordination games (see particularly Axelrod, 1984; Lewis, 1969; Orbell et al., 1984; Schotter, 1981; Taylor, 1976, 1981; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; see also Kliemt and Schauenberg, 1984; Voss, 1985). From the point of view of scholars interested in explaining various types of cooperation in real-life situations, this rapidly growing literature exhibits three major weaknesses.
The data on which this article is based were first presented in Opp, 1983. The theoretical aim of the article was a comparative evaluation of sociological explanations of white-collar crime on the one hand, and of an explanation derived from the rational choice model on the other. The author wishes to thank the publisher of the article, Carl Heymanns Verlag, and the editors of the Journal for the permission to use some sections of the article.
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References
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© 1986 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg Wien
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Opp, KD. (1986). The Evolution of a Prisoner’s Dilemma in the Market. In: Diekmann, A., Mitter, P. (eds) Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95874-8_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95874-8_11
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