The Evolution of a Prisoner’s Dilemma in the Market

  • Karl-Dieter Opp


The old issue whether cooperation evolves in a world of egoists and, if so, in what way has recently attracted attention by social scientists focussing on situations corresponding to game-theoretical models like the prisoner’s dilemma or coordination games (see particularly Axelrod, 1984; Lewis, 1969; Orbell et al., 1984; Schotter, 1981; Taylor, 1976, 1981; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; see also Kliemt and Schauenberg, 1984; Voss, 1985). From the point of view of scholars interested in explaining various types of cooperation in real-life situations, this rapidly growing literature exhibits three major weaknesses.


Cooperative Behavior Cohesive Group Coordination Game Rational Choice Model Role Relationship 
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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg Wien 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karl-Dieter Opp
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of SociologyUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany

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