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Reduction by dominance

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 365))

Abstract

In [6], it is shown that every discrete Silverman game with ν ≥ 1 reduces by dominance to a finite game, and in [7], it is shown that if Si ∩ [a,b] = Φ, where a and b are elements of S3-i, then b is dominated by a. In this section we shall discuss four types of dominance for Silverman games, including the above two. Through repeated reduction of the strategy sets S1 and S2 by means of these four types of dominance we obtain what we call pre-essential sets W̃1 ⊂ S1 and W̃2 ⊂ S2. These are minimal subsets in the sense that no further reduction is possible through the use of these four types of dominance.

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Heuer, G.A., Leopold-Wildburger, U. (1991). Reduction by dominance. In: Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 365. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95663-8_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95663-8_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-54372-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-95663-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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