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Abstract

A Silverman game is a two person zero sum game defined in terms of two sets, S1 and S2, of positive numbers and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty ν > 0. Players I and II choose numbers independently from S1 and S2, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses ν. If the numbers are equal the payoff is zero.

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Heuer, G.A., Leopold-Wildburger, U. (1991). Introduction. In: Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 365. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95663-8_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95663-8_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-54372-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-95663-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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