Conditions for a Mechanistic Theory for Behaviour
Must a neurophysiological account of human behaviour be a mechanistic one? Elsewhere in this volume Prof. Granit stressed the advantages of combining the teleological with the causal, strictly neurophysiologic account of reality, but he was approaching this antinomy in terms of the strategy of science. I should like to raise some of the philosophical issues underlying this strategy and its goals.
KeywordsMechanistic Theory Mechanistic Account Convergence Hypothesis Subjunctive Conditional Potential Rival
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Grene, M.: Reducibility — another side issue? In: Interpretations of life and mind. Ed.: M. Grene. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1971.Google Scholar
- Melden, A.I.: Free action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1961.Google Scholar
- Nagel, E.: The structures of science. Harcourt, Brace, and World 1961.Google Scholar
- Ryle, G.: Dilemmas. London: Cambridge U. Press 1954.Google Scholar