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Conditions for a Mechanistic Theory for Behaviour

  • Charles Taylor

Abstract

Must a neurophysiological account of human behaviour be a mechanistic one? Elsewhere in this volume Prof. Granit stressed the advantages of combining the teleological with the causal, strictly neurophysiologic account of reality, but he was approaching this antinomy in terms of the strategy of science. I should like to raise some of the philosophical issues underlying this strategy and its goals.

Keywords

Mechanistic Theory Mechanistic Account Convergence Hypothesis Subjunctive Conditional Potential Rival 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Grene, M.: Reducibility — another side issue? In: Interpretations of life and mind. Ed.: M. Grene. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1971.Google Scholar
  2. Malcolm, N.: The conceivability of mechanism. Phil. Rev. 77, 45–72 (1968).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Melden, A.I.: Free action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1961.Google Scholar
  4. Nagel, E.: The structures of science. Harcourt, Brace, and World 1961.Google Scholar
  5. Ryle, G.: Dilemmas. London: Cambridge U. Press 1954.Google Scholar
  6. Taylor, C.: Mind-body identity, A side issue? Phil. Rev. 77, 201–213 (1967).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1972

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles Taylor
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceMcGill UniversityMontrealCanada

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