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Dynamic Choices in Economics: A Compromise Approach

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Multi-Objective Programming and Goal Programming

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 432))

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Abstract

This paper formulates a dynamic compromise model where criteria are state variables evolving in time. Motion equations are determined under a few widely accepted assumptions in decision theory. It is noteworthy to point out that the equilibrium is reached at the L bound of the compromise set. Applications in several fields (economics, sociology, ecology, etc.) seem to be large. We highlight specially two applications: (a) the choice of consumer goods aggregates and (b) the Pigovian-Coasian reparation of a negative externality. Finally, some properties and tentative extensions are indicated.

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References

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Ballestero, E., Romero, C. (1996). Dynamic Choices in Economics: A Compromise Approach. In: Tamiz, M. (eds) Multi-Objective Programming and Goal Programming. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 432. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-87561-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-87561-8_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-60662-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-87561-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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