Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Bond Pricing through Bargaining

  • Conference paper
Financial Modelling

Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

  • 149 Accesses

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is that of studying an highly simplified thin market, where price and quantity are set by bargaining. First we do not explicitly model the bargaining process (axiomatic approach), then we do (strategic one). The traded amount is the same in both cases, since we demonstrate that it depends on Pareto efficiency, not on trade rules. Price on the contrary varies according not only to the approach, but also on the agents’ utility function. In the strategic context it depends also on the last mover’s advantage.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Binmore, K.G. (1987), Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models, in Binmore and Dasgupta (1987), pp. 77–105.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Binmore, K.G., and P. Dasgupta (1987), The Economics of Bargaining, Oxford, Black-well.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Fishburn, P.C., and A. Rubinstein (1982), Time Preference, International E-conomic Review 23, pp. 677–694.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Hasung Jang (1986), Efficient Security Trading with a Specialist: an Application of Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory, Working Paper, The Wharton School.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Nash, J.F. (1950), The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18, pp. 152–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Osborne, M.J., and A. Rubinstein (1990), Bargaining and Markets, New York, Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Rasmusen, E. (1989), Games and Information, Oxford, Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Rubinstein, A. (1982), Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50, pp. 97–109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Istituto di Matematica e Statistica, Facoltà di Economia e Commercio, dell’Università di Lecce, Via Dalmazio Birago 64, 73100, Lecce, Italy

    Elisa Luciano

Authors
  1. Elisa Luciano
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Istituto di Metodi Quantitativi, Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, via U. Gobbi, 5, I-20136, Milano, Italy

    Lorenzo Peccati

  2. Department of Economics, University of Turku, SF-20500, Turku, Finland

    Matti Virén

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1994 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Luciano, E. (1994). Bond Pricing through Bargaining. In: Peccati, L., Virén, M. (eds) Financial Modelling. Contributions to Management Science. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86706-4_17

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86706-4_17

  • Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0765-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-86706-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation