Advertisement

The Use of Causal Knowledge for Inferential Reasoning

  • Helmut Jungermann
  • Manfred Thüring
Part of the NATO ASI Series book series (volume 35)

Abstract

Experts from industry, economics, and science are asked to predict which information and communication techniques will be available in a private household in 25 years and which of these services will be supplied by state and industry. We ask social science experts to predict the effects of such techniques and services. While most expect a growth in these techniques and services, they disagree about their effects on social contacts, creativity among the young, and feelings of state control.

Keywords

Mental Model Private Life Mental Simulation Conjunction Fallacy Causal Knowledge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Alba, J. W., and Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic? Psychological Bulletin, 93, 203–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Anderson, J.R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Anderson, J.R., and Bower, G.H. (1973). Human associative memory. Washington: Winston.Google Scholar
  4. Bower, G.H., Black, J.B., and Turner, T.J. (1979). Scripts in memory for text. Cognitive Psychology, 11, 177–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Craik, K. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Einhorn, H.J., and Hogarth, R.M. (1986). Judging probable cause. Psychological Bulletin, 1, 3–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Einhorn, H.J., and Hogarth, R.M. (1982). Prediction, diagnosis, and causal thinking in forecasting. Journal of Forecasting, 1, 23–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Gentner, D., and Stevens, A.L. (eds.) (1983). Mental Models. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Google Scholar
  9. Jungermann, H. (1985a). Inferential processes in the construction of scenarios. Journal of Forecasting, 4, 321–327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Jungermann, H. (1985b). Psychological aspects of scenarios. In: V.T. Covello, J.L. Mumpower, P.J.M. Stallen, and V.R.R. Uppuluri (eds.), Environmental impact assessment, technology assessment, and risk analysis. New York etc.: Springer Publishing Company.Google Scholar
  11. Jungermann, H., Fleischer, F., Hobohm, K., Schöppe, A. und Thüring, M. (1986). Die Arbeit mit Szenarien bei der Technologiefolgenabschätzung. Berlin: Institut fur Psychologie, Technische Universität Berlin.Google Scholar
  12. Jungermann, H. and Thüring, M. (in press). The use of mental models for generating scenarios. In: G.Wright and P.Ayton (eds.), Judgemental forecasting. New York etc.: John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
  13. Kahneman D., and Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In: D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky (eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Norman, D.A. (1983). Some observations on mental models. In D. Gentner and A.L. Stevens (eds.), Mental models. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Google Scholar
  15. Norman, D.A., and Rumelhart, D.E. (1975). Explorations in cognition. San Francisco: Freeman.Google Scholar
  16. Pitz, G.F., and Sachs, N.J. (1984). Judgement and decision: Theory and application. Annual Review of Psychology, 35, 139–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Schank, R.C., and Abelson, R.P. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.MATHGoogle Scholar
  18. Thüring, M., and Jungermann, H. (1986). Constructing and running mental models for inferences about the future. In: B. Brehmer, H. Jungermann, P. Lourens, and G. Sevon (eds.), New directions in research on decision making. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
  19. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 4, 293–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Helmut Jungermann
    • 1
  • Manfred Thüring
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for PsychologyTechnical University of BerlinWest Germany

Personalised recommendations