Abstract
In 1931 Kurt Gödel [50, 51] proved a momentous theorem with far-reaching philosophical consequences: he showed that no reasonable formal proof sys-tern for number theory can prove all true sentences. This result set the logic community on its ear and left Hilbert’s formalist program in shambles. This result is widely regarded as one of the greatest intellectual achievements of twentieth-century mathematics.
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© 1977 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Kozen, D.C. (1977). Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem. In: Automata and Computability. Undergraduate Texts in Computer Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85706-5_48
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85706-5_48
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