The Management of Transboundary Fishery Resources: A Theoretical Overview

  • Gordon R. Munro
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY)

Abstract

One of the more important resource management issues arising from the implementation of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) is the management of transboundary, or shared, fishery resources. While the issue of transboundary fishery resources had, of course, existed before EFJ, there is no question that EFJ, resulting in the almost worldwide establishment of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), greatly magnified the issue. The EEZs collectively encompass fishery resources accounting for in excess of 90 percent of the world harvest of fish. In light of the mobility of finfish, at least, it is not surprising that many of the fish, thus encompassed, are found to move from one neighbouring EEZ to another, or to move between the coastal state EEZ and the remaining high seas, or both. Transboundary fishery resources are now ubiquitous.

Keywords

Biomass Assure Fishing Nash 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Arnason, R. (1989), Minimum Information Management with the Help of Catch Quotas, in P. Neher, R. Arnason and N. Mollett (eds.), Rights Based Fishing, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp. 215–241.Google Scholar
  2. BjOrndal, T. and A. Scott (1988), Does the Prisoner’s Dilemma Apply to a Fishery?, U.B.C. Department of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 88–33.Google Scholar
  3. Churchill, R.R. (1987), The EEC’s Contribution to ‘State’ Practice in the Field of Fisheries, in E.D. Brown and R.R. Churchill (eds), The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Impact and Implementation, Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, pp. 557–568.Google Scholar
  4. Clark, C.W. (1980), Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game Theoretic Analysis, in P. Liu (ed.), Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, New York, Plenum Press, pp. 117–132.Google Scholar
  5. Clark, C.W. and G.R. Munro (1982), The Economics of Fishing and Modern Capital Theory: A Simplified Approach, in L.J. Mirmann and D.F. Spulber (eds.), Essays in the Economics of Renewable Resources, Amsterdam, North Holland.Google Scholar
  6. Clarke, F.H. and G.R. Munro, Coastal States and Distant Water Fishing Nations: Conflicting Views of the Future, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  7. Kaitala, V.T. (1985), Game Theory Models of Dynamic Bargaining and Contracting in Fisheries Management, Helsinki, Institute of Mathematics, Helsinki University of Technology.Google Scholar
  8. Kaitala, V.T. (forthcoming), Nonuniqueness of No-Memory Feedback Equilibria in a Fishery Management Game, Automatica.Google Scholar
  9. Kaitala, V.T. and M. Pohjola (1988), Optimal Recovery of a Shared Stock: A Differential Game with Efficient Memory Equilibria, Natural Resource Modeling, Vol. 3, pp. 91–119.Google Scholar
  10. Levhari, D. and L.J. Mirman (1980), The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 649–661.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Lewis, T. and J. Cowans (1982), The Great Fish War: A Cooperative Solution, U.B.C. Department of Economics Resources Paper No. 84.Google Scholar
  12. Munro, G.R. (1979), The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. XII, pp. 355–376.Google Scholar
  13. Munro, G.R. (1987), The Management of Shared Fishery Resource under Extended Jurisdiction, Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 271–2%.Google Scholar
  14. Roth, A.E. (1979), Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems No. 170, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
  15. Thomson, W. (1989), Cooperative Models of Bargaining, University of Rochester, Rochester Center for Economic Research, Working Paper No. 177.Google Scholar
  16. Vislie, J. (1987), On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: A Comment on Munro’s Paper, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. XX, pp. 870–875.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gordon R. Munro
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada

Personalised recommendations