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Protectionist Rules and Internationalist Discretion in the Making of National Trade Policy

  • J. Michael Finger
Part of the Studies in International Economics and Institutions book series (INTERN.ECONOM.)

Abstract

The post-World War II deliberations on institutional arrangements for the world economy were successful in leading to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, the proposed International Trade Organization which would regulate international trade was not to be. There was a general reluctance among governments to accept institutionalized restrictions on the conduct of countries’ national trade policies. At the same time the ITO negotiations over the “rules” of the trading system were unsuccessful, the community of nations reached agreement on a significant package of reciprocal tariff reductions. The document or contract which gave legal effect to the agreed reduction of tariffs included three functional parts. The first of these committed each participating country to allow other participants access to its market at least as favorable as the schedule of its import restrictions it annexed to the agreement. When agreement involved reductions of tariffs, the negotiated reductions over previous rates were reflected in this schedule. Each schedule, the parties agreed, would be subject to MFN treatment within the group.1

Keywords

Trade Policy Dispute Settlement Import Competition International Trade Commission Escape Clause 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. Michael Finger

There are no affiliations available

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