Defense Outlays and Arms Control in the Election Cycle
The function of the US military defense outlays after World War II can by and large be presented as a piecewise linear continuous function. A new linear piece with a new degree of increase or decrease is initiated when the president changes, when a war starts, or when the de-escalation phase after a war is ended. The only phase with nonlinear defense outlays was the time of Carter, when the sum of the Warsaw Pact defense outlays reached that of the NATO countries. This caused a constant acceleration of the outlays. It could be shown that for the phases after elections the increase of the pieces is negatively related to the economic activity of the election year. A system of three rules is given which explains at what times arms control agreements can be signed. This system is again closely related to the election cycle. It predicts arms control agreements mainly for the two last years of the election periods. Both approaches indicate that the influence of the US public opinion on the policy more or less concentrates on the years of the election.
KeywordsIncome Dition Rounded Cuban Culmination
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census (Annually): Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
- US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1977): The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929–74, Statistical Tables. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
- Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee by the Council of Economic Advisors: (Quarterly), Economic Indicators, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (1982): Texts and Histories of Negotiations. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar