Abstract
Arms control agreements which include non-trivial verification procedures whose details are accessible to the general public are of special interest to the mathematically oriented analyst. This is typically the case with multilateral treaties under which verification is often performed by an international agency or by supranational commissions or institutions. Bilateral agreements often rely on national technical means or intelligence services. It is therefore extremely difficult to get sufficiently detailed information on these treaties as inputs to mathematical modelling.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Fichtner, J. (1986). On Concepts for Solving Two-Person Games Which Model the Verification Problem in Arms Control. In: Avenhaus, R., Huber, R.K., Kettelle, J.D. (eds) Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control. NATO ASI Series, vol 26. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82943-7_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82943-7_28
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