Conclusions and Implications

  • Timothy M. Devinney
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY)

Abstract

Non-price rationing has been viewed as having a number of causes. Early theory viewed rationing as inconsistent with a traditional competitive equilibrium and focused its attention on regulatory, monopolistic, or institutional constraints which might evoke such a reaction by suppliers. Later theory, armed with new information-based equilibria, looked to adverse selection and moral hazard as the perpetrator of rationing. The present model looks in a slightly different direction. Rationing is indeed an informational phenomenon. However, rather than viewing the lender as a quasi passive reactor in the market, the present model allows for a mechanism whereby information is synthesized. Rationing results as a by-product of this synthesization of information.

Keywords

Income Rosen Monopoly 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Timothy M. Devinney
    • 1
  1. 1.Owen Graduate School of ManagementVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA

Personalised recommendations