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Conclusions and Implications

  • Timothy M. Devinney
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY)

Abstract

Non-price rationing has been viewed as having a number of causes. Early theory viewed rationing as inconsistent with a traditional competitive equilibrium and focused its attention on regulatory, monopolistic, or institutional constraints which might evoke such a reaction by suppliers. Later theory, armed with new information-based equilibria, looked to adverse selection and moral hazard as the perpetrator of rationing. The present model looks in a slightly different direction. Rationing is indeed an informational phenomenon. However, rather than viewing the lender as a quasi passive reactor in the market, the present model allows for a mechanism whereby information is synthesized. Rationing results as a by-product of this synthesization of information.

Keywords

Interest Rate Monetary Policy Moral Hazard Credit Rationing Adverse Selection 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Timothy M. Devinney
    • 1
  1. 1.Owen Graduate School of ManagementVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA

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