A “Pollution” Game: A Theoretical and Experimental Study
Part of the Lecture Notes in Biomathematics book series (LNBM, volume 5)
The present paper investigates a 5-person-multistage non-cooperative game developed in the psychological literature. This game is presented here as an economic system with externalities.
KeywordsExpense Lution Dition Nash Librium
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1975