Abstract
The present paper investigates a 5-person-multistage non-cooperative game developed in the psychological literature. This game is presented here as an economic system with externalities.
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References
Dana, J. M., Rubenstein F. D. “The Psychology of Pollution and other Externalities,” Unpublished paper, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Graduate School of Business (1970).
Shapley, L. S., Shubik, M. “On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities,” The American Economic Review 59, 4 678684 (September 1969).
Watzke, G. E., Doktor, R. H., Rubenstein, F. D., Dana, J. M. M. “Individual vs. Group Interest: An Experimental Study in Three Cultures:, Preprint Series International Institute of Management, I/72–23 (August 1972).
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© 1975 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Bayart, D., Collomb, B., Ponssard, JP. (1975). A “Pollution” Game: A Theoretical and Experimental Study. In: Charnes, A., Lynn, W.R. (eds) Mathematical Analysis of Decision Problems in Ecology. Lecture Notes in Biomathematics, vol 5. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-80924-8_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-80924-8_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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