A “Pollution” Game: A Theoretical and Experimental Study

  • Denis Bayart
  • Bertrand Collomb
  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Biomathematics book series (LNBM, volume 5)

Abstract

The present paper investigates a 5-person-multistage non-cooperative game developed in the psychological literature. This game is presented here as an economic system with externalities.

Keywords

Expense Lution Dition Nash Librium 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Dana, J. M., Rubenstein F. D. “The Psychology of Pollution and other Externalities,” Unpublished paper, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Graduate School of Business (1970).Google Scholar
  2. Shapley, L. S., Shubik, M. “On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities,” The American Economic Review 59, 4 678684 (September 1969).Google Scholar
  3. Watzke, G. E., Doktor, R. H., Rubenstein, F. D., Dana, J. M. M. “Individual vs. Group Interest: An Experimental Study in Three Cultures:, Preprint Series International Institute of Management, I/72–23 (August 1972).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • Denis Bayart
    • 1
  • Bertrand Collomb
    • 1
  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard
    • 2
  1. 1.Ecole PolytechniqueFrance
  2. 2.Ecole Polytechnique and CESMAPFrance

Personalised recommendations