Abstract
A theory can be revised by replacing or modifying one or more of its component statements. Such revision is usually thought of as and often is of a straightforward factual claim. The discovery of a tenth planet would require simply that one specification of the solar system’s components be replaced by another in the classical mechanical theory of the solar system’s motion. The concepts used in this theory, e.g. ‘mass’, ‘force’, ‘natural satellite’, seemingly suffer no revision as a consequence of this type of theoretical revision.
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Kleiner, S.A. (1971). Criteria for Meaning Changes in Theoretical Physics. In: Bunge, M. (eds) Problems in the Foundations of Physics. Studies in the Foundations, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, vol 4. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-80624-7_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-80624-7_10
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