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Criteria for Meaning Changes in Theoretical Physics

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Part of the Studies in the Foundations, Methodology and Philosophy of Science book series (FOUNDATION, volume 4)

Abstract

A theory can be revised by replacing or modifying one or more of its component statements. Such revision is usually thought of as and often is of a straightforward factual claim. The discovery of a tenth planet would require simply that one specification of the solar system’s components be replaced by another in the classical mechanical theory of the solar system’s motion. The concepts used in this theory, e.g. ‘mass’, ‘force’, ‘natural satellite’, seemingly suffer no revision as a consequence of this type of theoretical revision.

Keywords

Conceptual Change Material Object Singular Term Cloud Chamber Particle Mechanic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1971

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GeorgiaAthensUSA

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