Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences

Abstract

There are many ways of approaching the transition from individual to collective. We can either study the conditions under which the vote is an efficient procedure of collective decision — consistent with the principle ‘a man, a vote’ —, (Moulin 1985, Saari 1986, Hosomatu 1978, Satterthwaite 1975), or inflect the field of individual preferences in order to develop a collective preference (Kim & Roush 1981, Dutta 1977, Mas-Colell & Sonnenschein 1972); it is also possible to analyze collective preference by the means of the conflict between individual interests (Salles & Wendel 1977). We therefore model them thanks to the game theory or by using typological methods (Lemaire 1981) or even by giving to the space of preferences some metric structures which yield functions of social choice (Heuchenne 1970, Luce 1956, Barthelemy & Monjardet 1979).