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Central Bank Independence and the Short-Run Output-Inflation Trade-off in the European Community

  • Carl E. Walsh
Part of the European and Transatlantic Studies book series (EUROPEANSTUDIES)

Abstract

The member countries of the European Community (EC) have established a process for moving toward a common monetary policy conducted by a single European Central Bank (ECB). The structure of this new policy institution, modeled after the German Bundesbank, has been specifically designed to guarantee it a high degree of independence from political influences. Empirical evidence linking independent central banks with low average inflation played an important role in giving impetus to the creation of a common central bank with substantial political independence.2

Keywords

Central Bank European Central Bank Phillips Curve Seemingly Unrelated Regression Central Bank Independence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carl E. Walsh

There are no affiliations available

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