Dynamic Noncooperative Firms R&D Strategies in an Oligopolistic Industry

  • Domenico Campisi
  • Paolo Mancuso
  • Alberto Nastasi
Conference paper
Part of the Operations Research Proceedings book series (ORP, volume 1994)

Summary

This paper deals with an oligopolistic industry where firms are engaged in R&D activity in order to maximize their market shares. The existence of an optimal R&D strategy for each firm is discussed using dynamic noncooperative game theory. Furthermore, the intertemporal relations among firms R&D investments, the unit costs of their outputs and their market shares are analyzed in connection with the extra-industry R&D activity and the spillover effect.

Keywords

Assure Lime Nash Oligopoly 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Basar T. and Olsder G. J. (1982), Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, Academic Press, New York.Google Scholar
  2. Campisi D. and Nastasi A. (1993), Competitive Pressure and R&D Strategies in an Oligopolistic Industry, Atti del IV Convegno Nazionale AUG, Roma, 29 ottobre 1993.Google Scholar
  3. Cohen M. W. and Levinthal D. A. (1989), Innovation and Learning: the Two Faces of R&D, The Economic Journal 99, 569–596.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Friedman J. (1990), Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, New York.Google Scholar
  5. Reinganum J. (1982), A dynamic game of R&D: patent protection and competitive behavior, Econometrica 50, 671–688.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Domenico Campisi
    • 1
  • Paolo Mancuso
    • 1
  • Alberto Nastasi
    • 1
  1. 1.RomaItaly

Personalised recommendations