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Coalition Breaking and Policy Reform

  • William E. Foster
  • Gordon C. Rausser

Abstract

In the previous chapter, de Gorter, Nielson, and Rausser address the possible complementarity of public good investments and wealth transfers to agriculture. Their model assumes that producers are homogeneous and concentrates on the tradeoffs between general transfers and public good expenditures. In this chapter we address the more realistic case of heterogeneous producers and derive the implications for the choice of the wealth transfer mechanisms.

Keywords

Public Good Equilibrium Price Transfer Scheme Payment Scheme Supply Elasticity 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • William E. Foster
  • Gordon C. Rausser

There are no affiliations available

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