Coalition Breaking and Policy Reform
In the previous chapter, de Gorter, Nielson, and Rausser address the possible complementarity of public good investments and wealth transfers to agriculture. Their model assumes that producers are homogeneous and concentrates on the tradeoffs between general transfers and public good expenditures. In this chapter we address the more realistic case of heterogeneous producers and derive the implications for the choice of the wealth transfer mechanisms.
KeywordsAssure Expense Nism Metaphor Nonin
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