An Impossibility Result Concerning Distributive Justice in Axiomatic Bargaining

  • Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert
  • Hans Peters
Conference paper

Abstract

A two-person bargaining solution is called endowment sensitive if in a distribution problem with money it favours the opponent of a player whose initial endowment increases. Endowment sensitivity is, thus, a fairness principle of distributive justice. We show that a bargaining solution that is endowment sensitive, scale covariant, and Pareto optimal, must be dictatorial.

Keywords

Covariance Income Nash Nonin 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert
    • 1
  • Hans Peters
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OsnabrückOsnabrückGermany
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of LimburgMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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