An Impossibility Result Concerning Distributive Justice in Axiomatic Bargaining
A two-person bargaining solution is called endowment sensitive if in a distribution problem with money it favours the opponent of a player whose initial endowment increases. Endowment sensitivity is, thus, a fairness principle of distributive justice. We show that a bargaining solution that is endowment sensitive, scale covariant, and Pareto optimal, must be dictatorial.
KeywordsCovariance Income Nash Nonin
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