Social Dilemmas and Cooperation pp 429467  Cite as
Ten rules of bargaining sequences A boundedly rational model of coalition bargaining in characteristic function games
Abstract
The paper presents a first outline of a model of the bargaining process in characteristic function games. It is based on the conclusions from more than 1000 experimental games with free communication with 3, 4, 5 and sometimes more players. The essence of this approach is, that the bargaining process can be modeled as a sequence of states or proposals, each of which dominates the preceding one. And, that there are certain laws or rules of boundedly rational behavior, according to which players behave when they change coalitions. These rules are presented.

structure of sequences of proposals (Rule 1)

phenomena of prominence (Rules 2, 3)

the phenomenon of reciprocal loyalty (Rules 4, 5)

conclusions from actions of others (attributed demands, Rule 6)

the recursive definition of stable states (Rule 7),

the opportunity to break a coalition, and thereby force the game back to a former state of the process (Rule 8),

principles of fairness, when forming the coalition of all players, and the stability of this coalition (Rules 9, 10).
Examples illustrate and motivate the conditions, and show phenomena that cannot be explained by traditional solution concepts.
Keywords
Coalition Formation Coalition Structure Payoff Distribution Grand Coalition Bargaining ProcessPreview
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