Toward more locomotion in experimental games
This chapter evaluates the traditional experimental gaming approach to the study of social interdependence. In addition to outlining several strengths, it is asserted that this approach is limited in two respects: (1) it does not enable a researcher to examine the ways in which individuals express their simple motivations and simple strategies when they are provided with more varied domain of options, and (2) it neglects an important domain of social interaction, namely those situations in which individuals are able to alter the underlying interdependence structure. The chapter reviews prior research that extends the traditional experimental gaming approach by offering subjects the possibility to alter the nature of interdependence. It is concluded that the ways in which individuals express their simple motivations and strategies may be importantly shaped by the availability of other options than a cooperative and noncooperative choice. To provide more insight into these processes, we should consider a greater locomotion in the way in which we use outcome matrices in our research on social interdependence.
KeywordsFatigue Assimilation Expense Stake
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