On the Assumption That Our Concepts ‘Structure the Material of Our Experience’

  • Felix Mühlhölzer


The general assumption that human knowledge depends, firstly, on our faculty to receive some raw material from the world outside us and, secondly, on our faculty to ‘organize’ or to ‘structure’ this material by means of certain concepts may sound quite innocent. At a close look, however, it appears to be anything but clear. In an article entitled “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, the philosopher Donald Davidson has called this assumption “the third dogma of empiricism” (Davidson 1984, 189).


Sense Data Inertial Frame Conceptual Scheme Sensory Stimulation Sensory Receptor 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Felix Mühlhölzer
    • 1
  1. 1.Seminar für Philosophie, Logik und WissenschaftstheorieMünchen 22Germany

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