The Expert’s Evidence and the Judge’s Evaluation of all Information in Court Decisions

  • K. Hummel
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Forensic Haemogenetics book series (HAEMOGENETICS, volume 5)

Abstract

A great part of legal judgments rests on deterministic evidence. Such evidence is always sufficient in law. But evidence may also be of a circumstantial, ie, a “probabilistic” nature. This type of evidence is not as “absolute” as the former. In consequence, an important role is reserved to the judge’s subjective conviction, ie: he reaches his conclusion through the sum of the circumstances.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. Hummel
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Blood-Group Serology and GeneticsFreiburgGermany

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