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Experimental Economics

  • Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger

Abstract

Experimental economics has become an important field within the economic theory. The roots go back to the beginning of our century. In this short survey we try to give an overview about some remarkable milestones in this direction, especially with a view to mathematical modelling of forcasts resp. predictions.

Keywords

Rational Expectation Economic Behavior Experimental Economic Economic Sociology Nash Equilibrium Point 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für Statistik, Ökonometrie und Operations ResearchKarl-Franzens-Universität GrazGrazAustria

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