Constituent-Sensitive Public Fund Sharing

  • János Aczél
  • Andreas Pfingsten


The member states of a federation usually have to share their revenues. They are supported by additional grants from the central government. It is controversial, however, how the states’ shares of public funds should be determined. We modify an earlier axiomatic approach to this problem. In particular we allow for state-specific equalization functions. It turns out, among others, that now different lump sum payments to the states may be made which, across the federation, must add up to zero.


Public Fund Cost Allocation Federal Grant Equalization Coefficient Final Fund 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • János Aczél
    • 1
  • Andreas Pfingsten
    • 2
  1. 1.University of WaterlooCanada
  2. 2.Universität GHSiegenGermany

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