To review how one country, the United Kingdom, intends to reform its health care system, the National Health Service.
To examine how the incentives inherent in these reforms are believed to work.
To challenge these beliefs by highlighting the paucity of theory and evidence about the working of competing incentive contracts.
To argue that the traditional economic paradigm may be too narrow and, if reforms about to take place in England and elsewhere are to be designed and evaluated efficiently, a broader theory of economic behaviour needs to be created.
KeywordsLabour Supply List Size Incentive Contract Piece Rate Health Care Market
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