Incentive Contracts

  • A. Maynard
Part of the Health Systems Research book series (HEALTH)


Rather than risking repetition and reviewing existing evidence about the effects of incentives on the behaviour of consumers and providers, the intention of this paper is to concentrate on the supply side of the market and:
  1. 1.

    To review how one country, the United Kingdom, intends to reform its health care system, the National Health Service.

  2. 2.

    To examine how the incentives inherent in these reforms are believed to work.

  3. 3.

    To challenge these beliefs by highlighting the paucity of theory and evidence about the working of competing incentive contracts.

  4. 4.

    To argue that the traditional economic paradigm may be too narrow and, if reforms about to take place in England and elsewhere are to be designed and evaluated efficiently, a broader theory of economic behaviour needs to be created.



Labour Supply List Size Incentive Contract Piece Rate Health Care Market 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991

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  • A. Maynard

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