Abstract
The subject of this paper is the reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The questions can be framed as follows: in what way can academics who consider the present situation unsatisfactory help to bring about a change? Are there ways in which they can accelerate the negotiating process? Are there ways in which they can bring nearer a further stage of reductions? What are the obstacles in the way of agreed reductions? Should the main objective be the reduction in the total number of warheads, or should there be some other objective?
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References
United States-Soviet Relations. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 98th Congress, first session on Arms Control Resolutions, Part 2 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1983), p. 191
Ibid, page 210
Arms Control Reporter, section on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 15 April 1988, p. 611. C. 53, Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies, Brookline, MA, USA
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© 1990 Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Blackaby, F. (1990). Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Warheads. In: Rotblat, J., Holdren, J.P. (eds) Building Global Security Through Cooperation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75843-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75843-0_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-75845-4
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