Abstract
Recent developments in noncooperative game theory (especially those dealing with information transmission and equilibrium refinements) are illustrated by means of variations on a simple market entry game.
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© 1990 Springer-Verlag Heidelberg
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van Damme, E. (1990). Signaling and Forward Induction in a Market Entry Context. In: Kistner, KP., Ahrens, J.H., Feichtinger, G., Minnemann, J., Streitferdt, L. (eds) Papers of the 18th Annual Meeting / Vorträge der 18. Jahrestagung. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 1989. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75639-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75639-9_5
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