Abstract
The verification procedures contained within the INF Treaty have important implications for the relationship between the superpowers, setting as they do the scene for future arms control measures. This paper examines the extent to which INF verification measures can be built on in the negotiation of a START treaty and in the Nuclear Test Ban negotiations. Successful negotiation of a START verification package, especially one capable of addressing the question of mobile missiles (SS-25, SS-24, Midgetman and long-range sea launched cruise missiles), will involve extensive collaboration between the USA and the USSR. I will argue that the kinds of co-operative measure which would have to be involved in a viable START treaty could in turn set the scene, if coupled with judicious use of confidence-building measures, for an effectively verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Leggett, J. (1989). A Comprehensive Test-Ban Verification Regime: Implications of Cooperative Measures in INF and START. In: Rotblat, J., Goldanskii, V.I. (eds) Global Problems and Common Security. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75072-4_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75072-4_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-75074-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-75072-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive