Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions

  • Amos Tversky
  • Daniel Kahneman
Part of the NATO ASI Series book series (volume 56)


Alternative descriptions of a decision problem often give rise to different preferences, contrary to the principle of invariance that underlines the rational theory of choice. Violations of this theory are traced to the rules that govern the framing of decision and to the psychological principles of evaluation embodied in prospect theory. Invariance and dominance are obeyed when their application is transparent and often violated in other situations. Because these rules are normatively essential but descriptively invalid, no theory of choice can be both normatively adequate and descriptively accurate.


American Economic Review Prospect Theory Stochastic Dominance Loss Aversion Canonical Representation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amos Tversky
    • 1
  • Daniel Kahneman
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyStanford UniversityStanfordUSA
  2. 2.Department of PsychologyUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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