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Multiple Criteria Decision Making and Risk Analysis Using Microcomputers pp 81–126Cite as

Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions

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Part of the book series: NATO ASI Series ((NATO ASI F,volume 56))

Abstract

Alternative descriptions of a decision problem often give rise to different preferences, contrary to the principle of invariance that underlines the rational theory of choice. Violations of this theory are traced to the rules that govern the framing of decision and to the psychological principles of evaluation embodied in prospect theory. Invariance and dominance are obeyed when their application is transparent and often violated in other situations. Because these rules are normatively essential but descriptively invalid, no theory of choice can be both normatively adequate and descriptively accurate.

This work has appeared in The Journal of Business, 1986, vol. 59(4), pt.2, pp. 251 – 278

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94705, USA

    Amos Tversky

  2. Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, California, 94720, USA

    Daniel Kahneman

Authors
  1. Amos Tversky
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  2. Daniel Kahneman
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH, 44 555, USA

    Birsen Karpak

  2. School of Management, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, 14 260, USA

    Stanley Zionts

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© 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1989). Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. In: Karpak, B., Zionts, S. (eds) Multiple Criteria Decision Making and Risk Analysis Using Microcomputers. NATO ASI Series, vol 56. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-74919-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-74919-3_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-74921-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-74919-3

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