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Macht: Eine ökonomische Analyse

  • B. S. Frey

Zusammenfassung

Meist gilt es als selbstverständlich: „Je höher die Position, desto mehr Macht“. Der Direktor einer Unternehmung und der General einer Armee sind mächtig. Daß sich Position und Macht entsprechen, gilt als so offensichtlich, daß es gar trivial erscheint. Diese Korrelation wird nicht nur im täglichen Leben, sondern auch in der Wissenschaft unterstellt.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989

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  • B. S. Frey

There are no affiliations available

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