A Folk Theorem of Monetary Policy

  • Carlo Carraro
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY)

Abstract

The analysis of effectiveness and optimality of economic policy by using game theory is a crucial issue of contemporary macroeconomics. International policy coordination and the role of monetary policy are the topics more frequently analysed.

Keywords

Assure Nash Folk Oligopoly 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abreu, D. (1986), “Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames”, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 191–225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Backus, D. and Driffill, J.(1985a), “Inflation and Reputation”, American Economic Review, June.Google Scholar
  3. Backus, D. and Driffill, J. (1985b), “Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility following a Change in Regime”, Review of Economic Studies, April.Google Scholar
  4. Barro, R.J. (1976), “Rational Expectations and the Role of Monetary Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 2, 1–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Barro, R.J. (1986), “Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion”, Economic Journal, Supplement, 96, 23–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Barro, R.J. and Gordon, D. (1983a), “Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Barro, R.J. and Gordon, D. (1983b), “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model”, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Benoit, J.P. and Krishna, V. (1985), “Finitely Repeated Games”, Econometrica, 53, 905–922.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Carraro, C. (1985), “Hierarchical Games for Macroeconomic Policy Analysis”, chapter 3 of “New Methods for Macroeconomic Policy Analysis”, Ph. D. Dissertation, Princeton University. Also in Carraro, C. and Sartore, D. (1987), eds., Developments of Control Theory for Economic Analysis, Martinus Nijhoff, Amsterdam.Google Scholar
  10. Carraro, C. (1986a), “The Theory of Optimal Announcements”, in Martos, B. and Ziermann, C. (1987), eds., Dynamic Modelling and Control of National Economies, Pergamon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  11. Carraro, C. (1986b), “Stackelberg Trigger Strategy and Monetary Policy”, Nota di Lavoro 8612, University of Venice.Google Scholar
  12. Carraro, C. (1987), “Credibility, Reputation and the Indeterminacy of Macroeconomics”, in Artus, P., Barroux, Y. and McKenzie, G. (1988), eds., title to be announced, Kluwer Academic Pub., Dordrecht.Google Scholar
  13. Carraro, C. and Siniscalco, D. (1987), “Producers’ Strategies in the Oil Market: a Game-Theoretic Framework”, mimeo.Google Scholar
  14. Cukierman, A. (1986), “Central Bank Behaviour and Credibility: Some Recent Theoretical Developments”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 5–17.Google Scholar
  15. Friedman, J.W. (1971), “A Noncooperative Equilibrium for Supergames”, Review of Economic Studies, 38, 1–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Friedman, J.W. (1985), “Cooperative Equilibria in Finite Horizon Noncooperative Supergames”, Journal of Economic Theory, 35, 390–398.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Friedman, J.W. (1986), Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  18. Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. (1983), “Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games”, Journal of Economic Theory, 31, 251–268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E. (1986), “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information”, Econometrica, 54, 533–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Gardner, P. (1973), “Mathematical Games”, Scientific American.Google Scholar
  21. Green, E.J. and Porter, R.H. (1984), “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information”, Econometrica, 52, 87–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Kalai, E. and Stanford, W. (1985), “Conjectural Variations Strategies in Accelerated Cournot Games”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3, 133–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Kohlberg, E. and Mertens, J.F. (1986), “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria”, Econometrica 54, 1003–1037.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Kreps, D.M. and Wilson, R. (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Information”, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253–279.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Kreps, D.M. et al. (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma”, Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245–252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Kydland, F. and Prescott, E.C. (1977), “Rules rather than Discretion the Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Journal of Political Economy, 473–491.Google Scholar
  27. Lucas, R.E. (1973), “Some International Evidence of Output Inflation Trade-Offs”, American Economic Review, 326–334.Google Scholar
  28. Robson, A.J. (1986), “The Existence of Nash Equilibria in Reaction Functions for Dynamic Models of Oligopoly”, International Economic Review, 27, 539–544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Rogoff, K. (1986), “Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy”, mimeo, University of Wisconsin.Google Scholar
  30. Rothemberg, J.J. and Saloner, G. (1986), “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms”, American Economic Review, 76, 390–407.Google Scholar
  31. Schotter, A. (1980), The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  32. Selten, R. (1978), “The Chain-Store Paradox”, Theory and Decision, 9, 127–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Stanford, W. (1986a), “On Continuous Reaction Function Equilibria in Duopoly Supergames with Mean Payoffs”, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 233–250.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Stanford, W. (1986b), “Subgame Perfect Reaction Function Equilibria in Discounted Duopoly Supergames are Trivial”, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 226–232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlo Carraro
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Venice and CEPRItaly

Personalised recommendations