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Debt Contract under Imperfect Information: A Survey

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Monetary Theory and Policy

Part of the book series: Studies in Contemporary Economics ((CONTEMPORARY))

Abstract

The classical analysis in terms of supply and demand appear irrelevant when the problem at hand is related to lending, and to the credit market. The limits that are imposed to the level of a firm’s debt by its creditors, or the effect of a firm’s capital structure on its value are phenomena that would still remain unexplained had the supply-demand analysis been uniquely employed.

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© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Freixas, X. (1988). Debt Contract under Imperfect Information: A Survey. In: Laussel, D., Marois, W., Soubeyran, A. (eds) Monetary Theory and Policy. Studies in Contemporary Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-74104-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-74104-3_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50322-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-74104-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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