Abstract
For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose unique dominant strategies Nash equilibrium implements the Nash solution of the bargaining problem.
Helpful discussions with Bernd Korthues, Jörg Naeve and particularly with Till Requate are gratefully acknowledged.
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Trockel, W. (1998). An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies. In: Abramovich, Y., Avgerinos, E., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Functional Analysis and Economic Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-72222-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-72222-6_15
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