Rents as Distractions: Why the Exit from Transition is Prolonged

  • Alan Gelb
  • Arye L. Hillman
  • Heinrich W. Ursprung
Part of the Studies in International Economics and Institutions book series (INTERN.ECONOM.)

Abstract

The notions of rent and rent-seeking have a substantial contribution to make in offering a theoretical and analytical framework for understanding events and behavior in the transition. The theory of rent-seeking behavior reveals how economic incentives combined with political discretion and unclear property rights attract individuals’ attention to unproductive activities directed at contesting available rents. This paper provides a review of rent-seeking theory with a directed focus on the role of rents and rent-seeking incentives in the transition. We indicate how rents and rent-seeking can be endemic to an economy in transition, and how recognition of rent-seeking incentives enhances understanding of the reasons why the transition to market economy is an extended process..

Keywords

Europe Income Expense Agglomeration Dition 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alan Gelb
    • 1
  • Arye L. Hillman
    • 1
  • Heinrich W. Ursprung
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBar-Ilan UniversityRamat - GanIsrael

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