Are Cartel Laws Bad for Business?

  • Reinhard Selten

Abstract

Consider a cartel law which forbids any kind of collusion in oligopolistic markets and is actually enforced. In this kind of legal environment prices can be expected to be lower than in a situation where binding agreements are permissible. Therefore, cartel laws are in the interest of the consumer.

Keywords

Nash Librium Monopoly dMds Oligopoly 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Reinhard Selten
    • 1
  1. 1.Universität BielefeldBielefeldGermany

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