The Hypothesis of the Plausibility Strategy

  • Bert Hamminga
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY, volume 4)

Abstract

Now let us see the “results” in the framework of the Ohlin-Samuelson programme as results of mental behaviour of programme participants. Thus seen the mental behaviour requires explanation. Why do economists participate in the programme? What is on their minds? What would be the economists’ answer to the question “why do you consider field extension, weakening of conditions, finding conditions for conditions and alternative conditions to be (positive) results, to be “successes” of the programme? Why do you aim at these results?”

Keywords

Income Hunt Defend Stake 

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References

  1. Stolper and Samuelson (1941), p. 72.Google Scholar
  2. Stolper and Samuelson (1941), p. 72.Google Scholar
  3. Södersten and Vind (1968), p. 405. As we defended in C.3.3., this statement is a false account of their own results, but it reflects awareness of the aims of the programme and is therefore quoted here.Google Scholar
  4. Södersten (1970), p. 48.Google Scholar
  5. Chipman (1966), p. 20 (italics his).Google Scholar
  6. The origin of the examples adduced is specified below in footnotes. All examples adduced take a more or less central place in general accounts of neoclassical pure international trade theory like Chipman (1966) and Södersten (1970).Google Scholar
  7. Treated in C.4.2.1.Google Scholar
  8. Chipman (1966), p. 25. To be sure, the violation of these conditions opens the possibility for factor prices not te equalise. See for the treatment of these conditions: C.4.2.2.. The italics in the quotation are mine.Google Scholar
  9. Samuelson (1949), p. 188.Google Scholar
  10. See B.2.5. for a treatment of this condition.Google Scholar
  11. Koo (1953), p. 53.Google Scholar
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  13. Södersten and Vind (1968), p. 403–5.Google Scholar
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  15. Chipman (1966), p. 33, my italics. The original text goes “… n > m…” and is adapted here to my notation.Google Scholar
  16. Land (1959).Google Scholar
  17. Land (1959), p. 140.Google Scholar
  18. Land (1959), p. 142, my italicsGoogle Scholar
  19. Samuelson (1948), pp. 180–183, italics his.Google Scholar
  20. Ohlin (1933), preface.Google Scholar
  21. p. 31, my italics.Google Scholar
  22. Samuelson (1948), p. 170.Google Scholar
  23. ibid., pp. 169–170, “circumstance” (1) to (3).Google Scholar
  24. ibid., p. 170, “circumstance” (4).Google Scholar
  25. See E.3.2.1.1., part a), for a treatment of economic meaning in conditions-plausibilismGoogle Scholar
  26. See C.3.3.Google Scholar
  27. Södersten and Vind (1968), p. 398.Google Scholar
  28. See C.4.1.Google Scholar
  29. Samuelson (1948), p. 169.Google Scholar
  30. Chipman (1966), p. 32. Original text goes “…n>m…”. See p. 83nGoogle Scholar
  31. Terms borrowed from Imre Lakatos (1970).Google Scholar
  32. See E.3.2.1.2..Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bert Hamminga
    • 1
  1. 1.Katholieke Hogeschool TilburgTilburgThe Netherlands

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