Subjunctive Conditionals in Decision and Game Theory

  • Reinhard Selten
  • Ulrike Leopold
Part of the Studies in Contemporary Economics book series (CONTEMPORARY, volume 2)


Counterfactuals arise naturally in decision and game theory. In order to see whether a certain course of action is optimal it is often necessary to look at situations which would arise if something non-optimal were done. Since in fact a rational decision maker will not take a nonoptimal choice, the examination of the consequences of such choices will necessarily involve counterfactuals.


Game Theory Parameter Theory Expected Utility Maximization Subjunctive Conditional World Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Reinhard Selten
  • Ulrike Leopold

There are no affiliations available

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