Subjunctive Conditionals in Decision and Game Theory
Counterfactuals arise naturally in decision and game theory. In order to see whether a certain course of action is optimal it is often necessary to look at situations which would arise if something non-optimal were done. Since in fact a rational decision maker will not take a nonoptimal choice, the examination of the consequences of such choices will necessarily involve counterfactuals.
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