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Dynamic Advertising and Pricing in an Oligopoly: a Nash Equilibrium Approach

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Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 265))

Abstract

A general dynamic oligopolistic price-advertising model is formulated and open-loop Nash solutions are derived. As a main result a generalisation of the well known Dorfman — Steiner — Theorem to heterogenous oligopoly markets is presented. Furthermore a detailed discussion of long run equilibrium solutions is given. For an important special case of the general model formulation it is shown that the optimal advertising policies are constant over time and constitute degenerated feedback solutions.

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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dockner, E., Feichtinger, G. (1986). Dynamic Advertising and Pricing in an Oligopoly: a Nash Equilibrium Approach. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-16435-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-61636-5

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