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Applications of Dynamic Game Theory to Macroeconomics

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Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 265))

Abstract

This paper surveys some macroeconomic applications of dynamic game theory. We begin by defining dynamic games and their solution concepts. We then turn to the applications and cover the following areas: economic growth and income distribution, macroeconomic stabilization, interaction between the government and the private sector, international policy coordination and conflicts among sectors in the economy.

I wish to thank Pertti Haaparanta, Seppo Honkapohja and Raimo P. Hämäläinen for helpful comments. Financial support from the Yrjö Jahns- son Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Helsinki, Aleksanterinkatu 7, 00100, Helsinki, Finland

    Matti Pohjola

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  1. Matti Pohjola
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1101 W. Springfield Avenue, Urbana, Illinois, 61801, USA

    Tamer Başar

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Pohjola, M. (1986). Applications of Dynamic Game Theory to Macroeconomics. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-16435-7

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